About this Author
College chemistry, 1983
The 2002 Model
After 10 years of blogging. . .
Derek Lowe, an Arkansan by birth, got his BA from Hendrix College and his PhD in organic chemistry from Duke before spending time in Germany on a Humboldt Fellowship on his post-doc. He's worked for several major pharmaceutical companies since 1989 on drug discovery projects against schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, diabetes, osteoporosis and other diseases.
To contact Derek email him directly: email@example.com
August 22, 2014
Science has an article by journalist Ken Garber on palbociclib, the Pfizer CDK4 compound that came up here the other day when we were discussing their oncology portfolio. You can read up on the details of how the compound was put in the fridge for several years, only to finally emerge as one of the company's better prospects. The roots of the project go back to about 1995 at Parke-Davis:
Because the many CDK family members are almost identical, “creating a truly selective CDK4 inhibitor was very difficult,” says former Parke-Davis biochemist Dave Fry, who co-chaired the project with chemist Peter Toogood. “A lot of pharmaceutical companies failed at it, and just accepted broad-spectrum CDK inhibitors as their lead compounds.” But after 6 years of work, the pair finally succeeded with the help of some clever screens that could quickly weed out nonspecific “dirty” compounds.
Their synthesis in 2001 of palbociclib, known internally as PD-0332991, was timely. By then, many dirty CDK inhibitors from other companies were already in clinical trials, but they worked poorly, if at all. Because they hit multiple CDK targets, these compounds caused too much collateral damage to normal cells. . .Eventually, most efforts to fight cancer by targeting the cell cycle ground to a halt. “Everything sort of got hung up, and I think people lost enthusiasm,” Slamon says.
PD-0332991 fell off the radar screen. Pfizer, which had acquired Warner-Lambert/Parke-Davis in 2000 mainly for the cholesterol drug Lipitor, did not consider the compound especially promising, Fry says, and moved it forward haltingly at best. “We had one of the most novel compounds ever produced,” Fry says, with a mixture of pride and frustration. “The only compound in its class.”
A major merger helped bury the PD-0332991 program. In 2003, Pfizer acquired Swedish-American drug giant Pharmacia, which flooded Pfizer's pipeline with multiple cancer drugs, all competing for limited clinical development resources. Organizational disarray followed, says cancer biologist Dick Leopold, who led cancer drug discovery at the Ann Arbor labs from 1989 to 2003. “Certainly there were some politics going on,” he says. “Also just some logistics with new management and reprioritization again and again.” In 2003, Pfizer shut down cancer research in Ann Arbor, which left PD-0332991 without scientists and managers who could demand it be given a chance, Toogood says. “All compounds in this business need an advocate.”
So there's no doubt that all the mergers and re-orgs at Pfizer slowed this compound down, and no doubt a long list of others, too. The problems didn't end there. The story goes on to show how the compound went into Phase I in 2004, but only got into Phase II in 2009. The problem is, well before that time it was clear that there were tumor types that should be more sensitive to CDK4 inhibition. See this paper from 2006, for example (and there were some before this as well).
It appears that Pfizer wasn't going to develop the compound at all (thus that long delay after Phase I). They made it available as a research tool to Selina Chen-Kiang at Weill Cornell, who saw promising results with mantle cell lymphoma, then Dennis Slamon and RIchard Finn at UCLA profiled the compound in breast cancer lines and took it into a small trial there, with even more impressive results. And at this point, Pfizer woke up.
Before indulging in a round of Pfizer-bashing, though, It's worth remembering that stories broadly similar to this are all too common. If you think that the course of true love never did run smooth, you should see the course of drug development. Warner-Lambert (for example) famously tried to kill Lipitor more than once during its path to the market, and it's a rare blockbuster indeed that hasn't passed through at least one near-death-experience along the way. It stands to reason: since the great majority of all drug projects die, the few that make it through are the ones that nearly died.
There are also uncounted stories of drugs that nearly lived. Everyone who's been around the industry for a while has, or has heard, tales of Project X for Target Y, which was going along fine and looked like a winner until Company Z dropped for Stupid Reason. . .uh, Aleph. (Ran out of letters there). And if only they'd realized this, that, and the other thing, that compound would have made it to market, but no, they didn't know what they had and walked away from it, etc. Some of these stories are probably correct: you know that there have to have been good projects dropped for the wrong reasons and never picked up again. But they can't all be right. Given the usual developmental success rates, most of these things would have eventually wiped out for some reason. There's an old saying among writers that the definition of a novel is a substantial length of narrative fiction that has something wrong with it. In the same way, every drug that's on the market has something wrong with it (usually several things), and all it takes is a bit more going wrong to keep it from succeeding at all.
So where I fault Pfizer in all this is in the way that this compound got lost in all the re-org shuffle. If it had developed more normally, its activity would have been discovered years earlier. Now, it's not like there are dozens of drugs that haven't made it to market because Pfizer dropped the ball on them - but given the statistics, I'll bet that there are several (two or three? five?) that could have made it through by now, if everyone hadn't been so preoccupied with merging, buying, moving, rearranging, and figuring out if they were getting laid off or not.
The good thing is that other companies stepped into the field on the basis of those earlier publications, and found CDK4/6 inhibitors of their own (notably Novartis and Lilly). This is why I think that huge mergers hurt the intellectual health of the drug industry. Take it to the reducio ad not all that absurdum of One Big Drug Company. If we had that, and only that, then whole projects and areas of research would inevitably get shelved, and there would be no one left to pick them up at all. (I'll also note, in passing, that should all of the CDK inhibitors make it to market, that there will be yahoos who decry the whole thing as nothing but a bunch of fast-follower me-too drugs, waste of time and money, profits before people, and so on. Watch for it.)
+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Cancer | Drug Development | Drug Industry History
August 20, 2014
John LaMattina has a look at Pfizer's oncology portfolio, and what their relentless budget-cutting has been doing to it. The company is taking some criticism for having outlicensed two compounds (tremelimumab to AstraZeneca and neratinib to Puma) which seem to be performing very well after Pfizer ditched them. Here's LaMattina (a former Pfizer R&D head, for those who don't know):
Unfortunately, over 15 years of mergers and severe budget cuts, Pfizer has not been able to prosecute all of the compounds in its portfolio. Instead, it has had to make choices on which experimental medicines to keep and which to set aside. However, as I have stated before, these choices are filled with uncertainties as oftentimes the data in hand are far from complete. But in oncology, Pfizer seems to be especially snake-bit in the decisions it has made.
That goes for their internal compounds, too. As LaMattina goes one to say, palbociclib is supposed to be one of their better compounds, but it was shelved for several years due to more budget-cutting and the belief that the effort would be better spent elsewhere. It would be easy for an outside observer to whack away at the company and wonder how incompetent they could be to walk away from all these winners, but that really isn't fair. It's very hard in oncology to tell what's going to work out and what isn't - impossible, in fact, after compounds have progressed to a certain stage. The only way to be sure is to take these things on into the clinic and see, unfortunately (and there you have one of the reasons things are so expensive around here).
Pfizer brought up more interesting compounds than it later was able to develop. It's a good question to wonder what they could have done with these if they hadn't been pursuing their well-known merger strategy over these years, but we'll never know the answer to that one. The company got too big and spent too much money, and then tried to cure that by getting even bigger. Every one of those mergers was a big disruption, and you sometimes wonder how anyone kept their focus on developing anything. Some of its drug-development choices were disastrous and completely their fault (the Exubera inhaled-insulin fiasco, for example), but their decisions in their oncology portfolio, while retrospectively awful, were probably quite defensible at the time. But if they hadn't been occupied with all those upheavals over the last ten to fifteen years, they might have had a better chance on focusing on at least a few more of their own compounds.
Their last big merger was with Wyeth. If you take Pfizer's R&D budget and Wyeth's and add them, you don't get Pfizer's R&D post-merger. Not even close. Pfizer's R&D is smaller now than their budget was alone before the deal. Pyrrhus would have recognized the problem.
+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Cancer | Drug Development | Drug Industry History
August 15, 2014
There's a post by Peter Bach, of the Center for Health Policy and Outcomes, that's been getting a lot of attention the last few days. It's called "Unpronounceable Drugs, Incomprehensible Prices", and you know what it says.
No, really, you do, even if you haven't seen it. Too high, unconscionable, market can't support, what they can get away with, every year, too high. Before I get to the uncomfortable parts of my own take on this, let me stipulate a couple of things up front: (1) I do think that the industry is inviting trouble for itself by the way it it raising prices. It is in drug companies' short term interest to do so, but long term I worry that it's going to bring on some sort of price-control regimen. (2) Some drug prices probably are too high (but see below for what that means). Big breakthroughs can, at least in theory, command high prices, but not everything deserves to be priced at the level it is.
I was about to say "see below" again, but this paragraph is below, so here goes. Let me quote a bit from Bach's article:
Cancer drug prices keep rising. The industry says this reflects the rising costs of drug development and the business risks they must take when testing new drugs. I think they charge what they think they can get away with, which goes up every year. . .Regardless of the estimate, the pricing of new drugs for cancer and now other common diseases has come unglued from the rationale the industry has long espoused. Instead, pricing is explained by a phenomenon of increasing boldness by the industry against a backdrop of regulators and insurers who have no legal authority to dictate or even propose alternative pricing models.
Bach's first assertion is correct: drug companies are charging what they think they can get away with. In that, they are joined by pretty much every other business in the entire country. I did a post once where I imagined car sales transplanted into the world of drug sales- you couldn't just walk in and buy a car, for example. No, you had to go to a car consultant first, licensed by the state, who would examine your situation and determine the sort of car you needed. Once they'd given you a car prescription, you could then go to a dealer.
Well, we don't have that, but what car companies do charge is, well, what they can get away with. The same as steel companies, soft drink companies, cardboard box companies, grocery stores, and people who are selling their houses. You charge what you think the market will bear. Even people selling basic necessities of life like food and shelter charge what they think the market will bear. It's true that health care does feel different from any of those (a point that I went into in that post linked in the last paragraph), and there's the root of many a problem.
And, some will say, a big difference is that none of these other sellers have patents on their side, the legal right to put the screws on. But remember the flip side of the patent system: the legal certainty that you will lose that pricing power on a set date. The pricing of new drugs is completely driven by their expected patent lifetimes, because almost all the money that the developing company is ever going to make off the drug is going to have to be made during that period.
And sometimes that period isn't very long. The patent clock starts ticking a long time before a drug ever gets on the market; there are often only five to ten years left when it's finally approved for sale. There are other factors, too. Everyone is talking about the price of Sovaldi for hepatitis C, but no as many people have thought about the fact that the drug is, in fact, so effective that it has blown two other recently approved Hep C treatments right out of the market, well before their patent lifetimes had even expired. There really is competition in the drug business, and that sector shows it in action.
Now, what there isn't so much of is competition on price, true. And that's what you do see in the other businesses I named above. There are grocery stores that occupy the "Wonderful Prestigious High Quality" part of the market, and others that occupy the "Low Low Prices Every Day" part. (And interestingly, if you Venn-diagram out what's on the shelves of those two, there's still some overlap, allowing you to watch people paying wildly different prices for blueberries that came off the same truck, not to mention even less perishable stuff like aluminum foil). You don't see this in the drug industry, partly because for patented drugs we're never selling the same blueberries. the same gasoline, or the same khaki trousers. Even the biggest "me-too" drugs still differ from each other to some degree.
And that brings up another point. Bach uses (as his example of pricing in the cancer field) two Alk compounds, Xalkori (crizotinib) from Pfizer and Zykadia (ceritinib) from Novartis. Xalkori was first, and Bach makes a lot of the fact that Zykadia is priced higher, even though he says that Pfizer ran bigger clinical trials, had to work out the associated diagnostic test with the FDA, and launch the new mechanism into the oncology market. Novartis, he says, got to piggy-back on all that, and yet their drug is priced higher. There can be no other reason for that pricing decision, Bach says, other than that they can.
Let's go into some details that Bach's article leaves out. Zykadia is indeed second to market. But the time gap between the two drugs means that Novartis was working on it before they knew that Xalkori worked in the clinic. Bach makes an error here made by many others who have not actually done drug discovery work: the time course of these things is longer than it looks. A screen had to be run against Alk, compounds had to be confirmed, a medicinal chemistry team had to optimize them and make lots of new structures, all of which except one fell by the side of the road. The compound had to go through animal tests for efficacy and safety, and it had to be scaled up and formulated. And so on, and so on. Novartis did not sit back, watch Xalkori succeed, and then decide "Hey, we should get us some of that action, too".
Now Zykadia is, as Bach says, a second-line therapy. But it's approved for patients who do not respond to, or have become intolerant to Xalkori. So this "me-too" drug is, in fact, different enough to work on patients for whom Xalkori has failed. In fact, most patients will start to show relapse inside of a year on Xalkori, so it would appear that most non-small-cell lung cancer patients with multiyear survival are probably going to end up taking both compounds. Cancers mutate quickly, and we need all the options we can get - and guess what, some of those options are going to be second to market, because they can't all be first.
Another point to note is that while Zykadia was indeed approved on the basis of a smaller clinical trial set, that's because it received "breakthrough" designation from the FDA for accelerated review and approval. Startlingly, it actually got approved after Phase I trials alone. (Not bad for what Bach characterizes as a simple copycat drug, by the way). Novartis has run the compound in more clinical trials than that, and they continue to do so. It's not like they slipped in with a mere 163 patients and then trotted off to the FDA while brushing the dust off their hands. To find this out, by the way, you'll want to use "LDK378", the internal Novartis designation for the drug, and I'm passing this information on to Bach for free. Clinicaltrials.gov shows 13 trials in the US when you do that, and there are others outside the country as well.
Bach's article, as mentioned, plays down any differences between these two drugs, saying that "they have not been directly compared". But that's not accurate. Let me quote from that link in the paragraph just above:
As described by Shaw and colleagues in the New England Journal of Medicine, ceritinib has striking activity in ALK-rearranged NSCLC, both in treatment-naïve patients and in those who experienced tumor progression on crizotinib. . .The drug has clear pharmacological advantages over crizotinib. Its surprising level of activity in crizotinib-resistant tumors may be explained by its greater potency and its particular ability to inhibit ALK with gatekeeper mutations that confer resistance to crizotinib.
The two drugs have had a very important comparison: people who are going to die on Xalkori are going to survive longer if they switch to Zykadia. "Me-too" drug, my ass.
But rather than end on that note, tempting as that is, let me circle back to pricing once again. The price for these cancer drugs is not borne by individual patients emptying their piggy banks. It is borne by insurance, both private and government. And drug companies do indeed price their drugs at what the think the insurance plans will pay for them. This is not a secret, and should not be a surprise, and I continue to be baffled by people who react to this with horror and disbelief. Prices appear when you find out what the payers will pay. If Pfizer, Novartis, or Gilead priced their drugs at fifty million dollars a dose, no insurance company would reimburse. But the insurance companies are paying the current prices, and if they believe that they will be put out of business by doing so, they need to stop doing that. And they could.
They will, too, if we in the industry keep pushing them towards doing it. That's our big problem in drug development: our productivity has been too low, and we're making up for it by charging more money. But that can't go on forever. There are walls closing in on us from both sides, and we're going to have to scramble out from between them at some point. Pricing power can only take you so far.
+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Cancer | Clinical Trials | Drug Prices | Regulatory Affairs | Why Everyone Loves Us