About this Author
Derek Lowe, an Arkansan by birth, got his BA from Hendrix College and his PhD in organic chemistry from Duke before spending time in Germany on a Humboldt Fellowship on his post-doc. He's worked for several major pharmaceutical companies since 1989 on drug discovery projects against schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, diabetes, osteoporosis and other diseases.
To contact Derek email him directly: derekb.lowe@gmail.com
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Category Archives
October 6, 2008
Posted by Derek
Well, it looks as if I'll finally be able to stop talking about Imclone: the word came out this morning that they've agreed to a $70/share deal with Lilly. Some thoughts on this:
1. I would still like to know how the uncertainty around the Erbitux follow-up antibody is supposed to be resolved. It's hard for me to make sense of this for Lilly unless they think that they can get substantial revenue from it, and Bristol-Myers Squibb presumably will disagree with their projected figures. None of the news stories so far have addressed this issue, and I presume that it's going to be a matter for negotiations (or for the courts, if it comes to that).
2. It seems that some analysts are seeing this deal as a sign of weakness in Lilly's pipeline, perhaps signaling that Effient (prasugrel) might be delayed more or labeled so restrictively that it has no chance of living up to expectations. We'll see how Lilly's stock performs today, and read the mood of its investors.
3. Well, Carl Icahn really did have something up his sleeve. Considering what Imclone was trading at before all this, he has plenty of reasons to be happy. But now will he turn his attention to Biogen again, and try to do the same thing with (or to) them?
4. I stand corrected! I had trouble believing that someone would come in at this price under these conditions, but, well, here they are. I should keep in mind that a fair number of mergers and acquisitions in this industry seem problematic (or downright senseless) to me, and adjust accordingly.
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October 2, 2008
Posted by Derek
Word leaked out yesterday that Imclone’s secret bidder is Eli Lilly. Well, let’s revise that – so far, Lilly hasn’t made a bid for the company. And that’s the first thought I had about this business: isn’t it taking quite a while? You’ll recall that Carl Icahn told Bristol-Myers Squibb a couple of weeks ago that he’d been in talks with someone else. Then we were going to hear about it over the weekend. Then the name would be revealed Wednesday at midnight (of all times). Now here we are on Thursday with no official announcement.
And the delay probably doesn’t have anything to do with the situation in the credit markets, because Icahn has been sure to emphasize that the deal he’s looking at is not subject to financing. That means all this extra time is probably due to good old caution – and I don’t blame Lilly for mulling things over. There are plenty of reasons to wonder if Imclone is worth the money for an outside company, given its status with BMS. This clearly isn’t the instant-winner operators-are-standing-by deal that Imclone would like to have us believe it is.
Does a Lilly deal make sense? It might, if they could be sure that they were going to get the Erbitux follow-up. But I’m willing to bet that this is exactly the issue that things are stuck on, since BMS believes (with reason) that they have a share of it, and won’t give it up easily.
And I’d be willing to see this go through, even at a ruinous price, if it would get Carl Icahn out of the drug industry. But no such luck, I’m afraid. He’s probably still eyeing Biogen, and who knows who else. I spent some time yesterday going on about how we shouldn’t blame evil MBA types for the problems in our business, but Icahn is the sort of guy I’m nearly willing to make an exception for. A pure dealmaker, I don’t see him as someone who understands scientific research or who has the patience for it. If we’re going to point the finger at managers whose only goals seem to be to make the quarterly numbers and pump up the stock price, he’s as good an example as I can think of. A dose of this stuff is exactly what we don’t need at the moment.
One more consideration: who leaked Lilly’s name, anyway? The Wall Street Journal seems to have been the first with the story, quoting "people familiar with the matter". Well, cui bono? Who has an interest in moving it along and showing that it’s a real possibility, in getting possible bidders to feel some pressure? Who indeed?
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October 1, 2008
Posted by Derek
The more I think about all the research layoffs that have been going on for the last year or two around the industry, the more I think that we really are seeing a change in the way drug discovery is being done.
Most of the jobs have been lost from the large companies. There have, of course, been shutdowns at the smaller ones, but I don’t think that those have been running at any different rate than usual. Startups and other smaller shops are always rearranging as their skills, finances, and luck dictate – that seems to be going on at the usual pace. But what’s different is the wave after wave of job cuts at the Pfizers, GSKs, AstraZenecas, J&Js – the big hitters (and big employers) of the industry. Even the companies that haven’t had major layoffs (Novartis comes to mind) aren’t exactly hiring heavily.
So what’s going on? My take is still that this is a shift – as far as the US end is concerned – from larger research outfits to smaller ones. After all, the drugs are going to have to come from somewhere, and the deal-making for small companies that have something promising has been intense. It just seems that the larger companies don’t think that they can do as much of this discovery work themselves – not, at least, at the prices that make sense.
Now, it’s true that a lot of chemistry has been outsourced to contractors in India and China, and that several firms have opened research divisions of their own overseas. That’s a cost-cutting move, too, certainly – but look at what this says about research here in the US. Everyone knows – including the people in Shanghai and Hyderabad – that the difficult, high-level research is still not being done there. That’ll change, as the human and physical infrastructure improves, but the bulk of the outsourced chemistry is methyl-ethyl-butyl-futile stuff. It’s “Hey, make me a library based on this scaffold structure” or “Hey, make me fifty grams of this intermediate”.
This kind of thing is definitely cheaper to do outside the country. It’s not always as timely as it should be, or as well-done – so it’s not as cheap as it always looks. But overall, on the average, you can bang out compounds for less money by outsourcing. That’s not going to change, either. The countries that furnish the services may change, as time goes on. But until the whole world is a high-wage environment (or, more horribly, until the only countries that aren’t are so benighted that no such work can be done there), ordinary chemistry is going to be done where it can be done for the least money.
So what’s left for us here in the US? The hard stuff. The risky stuff. The science that needs well-paid experienced people hovering over it the whole time. The cheaper, easier research is leaving – a lot of it has left already. We get to take on the stuff that can’t be outsourced.
And that’s why I think that there’s a shift to smaller firms. They’re traditionally the risk-takers in this business, and I think that’s going to be more true than ever. The larger companies, to me, seem to be trying to play it safer than ever. They have huge costs to meet, and don’t seem to think that they can devote as much of their resources to taking chances. We can argue about whether’s that’s wise (after all, you might think that larger companies with more cash might be the ones who could afford more risk). But that’s not how it’s been working – not for quite a while, when you think about it.
Here’s the hard part: the world does not owe any of us a high-paying research job. Neither the world, nor the US government or the US pharma industry owe us jobs of any kind. I wish that that weren’t true, but it most certainly is. Those of us trying to make a living through science and drug discovery are going to have to scramble for it. We’re going to have to prove our worth to those who are in a position to pay for us, and we’re going to have to try to make as many of our own opportunities as we can.
There are some things that can help us out in this period (see below), and there are some others that will do none of us any good at all. I know from some of the comments here that not all of you will agree with this, but as far as I’m concerned, here are some of the no-good-whatsoever moves:
1. Complaining about the Evil Suits Who Are Ruining the Industry. Look, I’ve been unemployed in this business, too. A merger pitched several hundred of us out into the market when our entire site was shut down. But I didn’t think that it was being done because upper management was enjoying it. They were, as far as I can tell, trying to keep the company going while having it make as much money as possible – the same behavior that had been paying my salary, actually. The constant drive to do those things is what’s paid all our salaries. Now, that doesn’t mean that upper management is always right. I didn’t say that they couldn’t be stupid (hey, I’ve sat through some of those presentations, too). I’m just saying that they’re not evil. Ranting about it is a pointless distraction from the business of keeping your job or getting another one. And besides, if they really are making a stupid mistake, that creates opportunities later on (see below).
2. Complaining about All Those Foreigners. I have even less time for this one. As far as outsourcing goes, I don’t see how I can tell chemists in China not to do the same work as American chemists for less money. (We should be making sure that we’re not doing the same work – see below). This is how economies grow, and how the world improves. I’m living in one of the greatest places in the world, and have been making a better living than most of the world’s population: I have no room to tell someone that they can’t try to reach for the same standard of living.
And as for foreign scientists working here, well, I think that one of the reasons I’ve been living in one of the greatest places in the world is that it’s been a haven for all sorts of bright, hard-working people. We’re not going to turn this into an immigration blog – there’s lots of room to argue about our current policies, particularly regarding unskilled laborers. But that’s not what we’re dealing with in the sciences. As far as I can see, we can use all the intelligent, creative, entrepreneurial people we can take, and we need to make sure that our country is the kind of place that people like that aspire to live in.
So if those don’t do any good, what does? Well, look at the situation. This is, as I’ve said before, a terrible time to be an ordinary chemist in this industry. That goes for the ordinary biologists, too. We’ve all got to demonstrate why we’re worth what we want to earn, and doing something that can be done for half the price somewhere else isn’t going to cut it.
So improve your skills. Learn new techniques, especially the ones that are just coming out and haven’t percolated down to the crank-it-out shops in the low-wage countries. Stay on top of the latest stuff, take on tough assignments. Keeping your head down in times like these will move you into the crowd that looks like it can be safely let go.
That’s one thing. Another one is the traditional advice given in all industries: keep in touch with everyone you know around the business. Use networking sites, keep current phone numbers, drop people an e-mail now and then. Getting laid off may well have had nothing to do with what you did – but finding a new job will have everything to do with it. If you don’t have any contacts around the business, large outfits and small, you’re going to have a harder time of it for sure.
And finally, here’s a more macro-scale suggestion. We medicinal chemists need to think more about being the source of startup companies ourselves. That’s harder to do if you’re part of a service group, or if you have that mentality. If your job is to crank out molecules, then you need to find a place that needs someone to do that. But if you’ve got a larger skill set, it may be large enough to get together with some other creative people and try to get some funding for ideas that no one else is doing. People still need medicines, and as long as we can still discover them here, it sure beats waiting for the phone to ring. If the bigger companies are in fact making a mistake by cutting research, what better revenge than to make them wish they hadn’t?
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September 30, 2008
Posted by Derek
Today brings the news of which areas Pfizer has decided to bail out of: obesity, most cardiovascular (it seems), anemia, osteoporosis and some osteoarthritis, liver disease, and muscle. They're concentrating on oncology, pain, Alzheimer's, and diabetes, which the company seems to have identified as the best intersection of their pipeline and the associated profits.
This will probably fuel speculation that the company is Imclone's mystery bidder - that name will supposedly be revealed at midnight on Wednesday, if I'm reading these reports correctly. If so, that makes me want to groan and roll my eyes. I'm waiting for Carl Icahn to tell everyone that they'll have to say the secret password to find out.
That news item linked to above also mentions that Pfizer has shed ten thousand employees since January of last year. Yikes. And on that subject, I hear from several sources that GlaxoSmithKline is cutting preclinical development hard today. People seem to have known that it was coming today, and roughly how bad it would be, but today is supposedly the day that names are read off the list. Good luck to people there. The contractions continue.
There's no longer any doubt, in case anyone was wondering, that this is the worst stretch for research employment at the big pharmaceutical companies in at least twenty years (to my certain knowledge) and very likely much longer than that, from what longer-serving colleagues tell me. Frankly, I'm not sure we've ever seen anything quite like this - which makes further prediction impossible. . .
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September 26, 2008
Posted by Derek
So it seems that Bristol-Myers Squibb took my advice (yeah, sure) and made an insultingly incremental counteroffer for Imclone, raising their $60/share all the way to. . .$62. I was hoping for something more like $60.25 myself, but you can’t have everything. (I should send them a bill for consulting services and see how far that gets me).
Carl Icahn has replied in yet another public letter, saying that there must be more productive ways for BMS to enrich its lawyers. I notice that the folks at the Wall Street Journal’s Health Blog are getting tired of the extended correspondence between Icahn and BMS’s Jim Cornelius. Although I’m still enjoying the show, I can see where it will eventually pall.
Icahn claims that his mystery $70/share bidder is doing due diligence, which should be completed this weekend. You’d think that any due diligence worth the name would tell someone not to pay $70/share for Imclone while Erbitux is still tied up with Bristol-Myers Squibb and its successor’s status is still very much in doubt. Wouldn’t you? Just how long does it take to run those numbers, anyway? Especially in this financial market, with credit tightening and the investment banking community in chaos? Or is the whole thing just a load of. . .no, no, Carl Icahn wouldn’t stoop to tactics like that. And I am Marie of Rumania.
My prediction: 64% chance that the companies agree, with much face-saving theater, at a price of about $65 per share. 35% chance that the whole business falls apart for now, due to the uncertainly about IMC-11F8. And that leftover 1% chance is that there really is a $70/share bidder.
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September 25, 2008
Posted by Derek
I'm hearing reports that Pfizer is telling employees in various therapeutic areas right now that there will be deep cuts coming, and that more details will be coming out in about two weeks (individual-level layoff notices, etc.) I gather that obesity research is being hit hard, and some others as well - but any details from people in a position to know would be appreciated.
This is a heck of a time to be laid off, that's for sure. Here's hoping that things aren't as bad as I'm hearing. . .
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September 17, 2008
Posted by Derek
While the US has the world's most expensive prescription drugs, we have the world's cheapest generics: once that patent goes away, it goes away. But the generic drug business is still very profitable, and it's viciously competitive. One of the biggest players is India's Ranbaxy, now in the process of being acquired by Japan's Daiichi Sankyo. They compete hard at every step of the process, from fighting patent cases in order to make drugs go generic more quickly, right down to price and distribution to pharmacies.
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But it looks like they've been pushing it a bit too hard. The FDA has banned the import of thirty Ranbaxy-made drug substances after uncovering what they say are bad practices at three of the company's plants in India. And this comes on top of another investigation, an even more serious one, looking into whether the company out-and-out falsified data during the drug approval process.
The company seems to be co-operating with the first investigation, but they're fighting back hard on the second one - which makes sense, because that's the one that can really get them in trouble. Ranbaxy, for its part, seems to have suggested that some big-pharma rivals are behind the accusation. I doubt that myself, although it's not impossible - but neither is it impossible that the charges have something behind them. US companies have found themselves in big trouble over such issues, too.
Overall, what Ranbaxy and the other Indian drugmakers have to fear is ending up in the same public opinion category as the Chinese companies, who have had one quality scandal after another. It's going to be a long time before they lose their bad reputation, and the Indian firms definitely don't need to throw away what they've built up. Look for Ranbaxy to try to clear its name as fast and as publicly as possible.
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September 12, 2008
Posted by Derek
I haven’t mentioned the attempt by Bristol-Meyers Squibb to buy out Imclone until now, but there’s a nice . The reasons for the move are unsurprising – BMS would like all the revenue from Erbitux, instead of just a share of it, and sees some value coming up in Imclone’s pipeline (such as their development drug candidate IMC-11F8, vide infra). They’ve waiting quite a while, and apparently feel that the time is right – the only question is how much money such a move will cost them.
And that’s the question, all right, since Carl Icahn started talking this week about a mysterious preliminary offer from some unnamed other company for significantly more money ($70/share) than BMS is putting up. A lot of investors seem to have expected a sigh, a roll of the eyes, and a reach back into the pocket for more money - IMCL has been trading above the original $60/share offer. But that’s not what they’re getting, at least so far.
In a letter, Bristol-Meyers Squibb’s CEO is now reminding Icahn of a few things that you’d think would be obvious. One of them is that their offer is well-supported and requires no due diligence, as opposed to nebulous preliminary figures from companies that no one will name. The next paragraph is even more to the point:
As you know, Bristol-Myers holds the exclusive, long-term marketing rights in the United States to ERBITUX® and related compounds, including IMC-11F8. Bristol-Myers has no intention of agreeing to any modifications to these rights. ImClone also should understand that our offer is for the entire company, and any potential restructuring of the company could severely jeopardize ImClone’s value and deprive ImClone’s stockholders of the benefits of our offer.
That’s about the size of it, and I think that this message is being delivered in the way that Icahn understands best – right across the top of the head, with some good wrist action. There’s no reason for BMS to give up on their rights to Imclone’s products, except on terms that would make other potential buyers lose interest. Why would they? There is, I should add, quite a dispute between the two companies about who has the rights to that development antibody, IMC-11F8. Imclone has recently been acting as if BMS has no rights to it at all, but as that WSJ link makes clear, two years ago they clearly stated to Merck KGaA that the antibody falls within the scope of the BMS agreement. It's hard for me to see how they'll get out of that, and even if they do, it'll take a lot of expensive wrangling.
So, if there really is a company willing to go to $70 a share for Imclone, with revenue still flowing to BMS and plenty of legal uncertainty on top of that, well, this is the time for them to speak up. I’m not sure that there is one, despite what Icahn says, but perhaps he’s hoping for one to materialize. He’s always reckoned Imclone to be worth vast amounts more than people who know anything about oncology think it is, so maybe he sees no problem with those figures. Anyone else live in the same world?
Update: Icahn has already replied, in a fashion that makes this affair look to go on a while. He says that he "doesn't understand the point" of the BMS letter, and goes on to say:
. . .With respect to a potential restructuring of ImClone, rest assured that we will act in what we consider the best interests of all our shareholders and not just Bristol.
Obviously, should you wish to make another offer which you believe we would not find inadequate, you are free to do so. Upon receipt of that offer, we will respond appropriately.
Well! My guess is at this point that BMS will sit tight and wait to see if anyone really wants to get in on all this action - betting, reasonably I think, that no one will. I would enjoy it if they raised their bid to, say, $60.25, just to steam up Icahn's windows, but I assume that they're above that. As time goes on, with no competing bids in sight, I would think that Icahn and his board-of-buddies would have to submit the BMS bid to the shareholders - wouldn't they?
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September 11, 2008
Posted by Derek
There’s an interesting editorial in Nature Biotechnology on a role-playing exercise that took place recently in London. The UK government (in the form of the Bioscience Futures Forum) asked a University of London simulations group to work out what would happen to two identical companies in England and in the US. These would be university spin-offs with promising oncology compounds that had already shown oral activity in tumor models. (Here's the site for the whole effort - I have to say, it looks like an awful lot of effort for a two-day simulation).
What happened? Well, things diverged. The US version of the simulated company was able to raise more money, had better access to collaborations with larger companies, and better chances of going public by the end of the simulation. That gave them a broader platform to deal with setbacks in the original compound program. Meanwhile, the UK company faced this:
. . . the biotech finance marketplace in the United Kingdom is weak. AIM has little liquidity and virtually no follow-on market. Preemption rights allow existing shareholders to block potentially diluting but opportunistic fundraising rounds, such as private investments in public equity. And there is little access to debt capital for biotech firms.
The game also suggests that UK management and investors have mindsets adapted to constrained financial circumstances. They design businesses to fit the financial environment rather than seeking the environment that their business needs. They discount early valuations because of the inflexible later-stage financial circumstances. Their low expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies. In contrast, US management looks to build a sustainable business from the outset, and investors get higher returns as a consequence.
What I found interesting about the editorial, though, wasn’t these conclusions per se – after all, as the piece goes on to say, they aren’t really a surprise. (That makes you wonder even more about the time and money that went into this, but that's another issue). No, the surprise was the recommendation at the end: while the government agency that ran this study is suggesting tax changes, entrepreneur training, various investment initiatives, and so on, the Nature Biotechnology writers ask whether it might not be simpler just to send promising UK ideas to America. Do the science in Great Britain, they say, and spin off your discovery in the US, where they know how to fund these things. You'll benefit patients faster, for sure.
They’re probably right about that, although it’s not something that the UK government is going to endorse. (After all, that means that the resulting jobs will be created in the US, too). But that illustrates something I’ve said here before, about how far ahead the VC and start-up infrastructure is here in America. There’s no other place in the world that does a better job of funding wild ideas and giving them a chance to succeed in the market. The startup culture here a vital part of the economy and a great benefit for the world, and we should make sure to keep it as healthy as we can.
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Who Discovers and Why
September 10, 2008
Posted by Derek
The rumor seems to be going around that Pfizer might be making a bid for Bayer (aka Bayer/Schering). That sounds ridiculous to me, and if Pfizer actually does such a thing, then its management is even more starved for ideas than its nastiest critics could believe.
Why all the negativity? Well, Bayer doesn’t seem to be much of a fit, for one thing. The company’s Nexavar (sorafenib) oncology drug competes directly head-to-head with Pfizer’s Sutent (sunitinib), and a good chunk of that revenue goes to Onyx, anyway. (Which reminds me – I keep seeing mentions of that drug being an Onyx discovery which was picked up by Bayer, which isn’t right. That one was made at Bayer – why Onyx has a piece of it has to do with the biology, not the drug discovery). The market for kidney cancer would be completely tied up by a Pfizer/Bayer deal, which makes you wonder if the resulting behemoth would be required to divest one of the drugs.
Pfizer does like to pick up big-selling compounds by buying the whole company behind them, but Bayer/Schering doesn’t have anything in the Lipitor / Celebrex class right now. (Remember Celebrex?) They might have one coming, though, with their Factor Xa inhibitor, rivaroxaban: it’s expected to do very well in the extremely lucrative clotting market, but it’s not there yet. And besides, some of that one is already tied up with J&J, at least in the U.S.
Then there’s the general objection: I’d argue that Pfizer is in the shape it’s in because they’ve pursued the big, big, acquisition strategy. Their own labs have been unproductive, and they unfortunately seem to spray down the research organizations they purchase with whatever’s in the air supply at the home base. OK, that’s probably unfair – but no one can deny that as a whole, Pfizer’s internal drug discovery efforts have been remarkably frustrating for many years now. And they’ve got a massive cost structure, what with all the various facilities they’ve accumulated over the years, which is what’s led to things like their mass exodus from Michigan.
More of that sort of thing is what I expect from Pfizer, not some big acquisition. (And I suppose that it should be mentioned that it’s now a widely held belief that more layoffs are coming there this fall, anyway). But if they buy something, it won’t be pretty. What they need is revenue to replace Lipitor in a few years, not people or research facilities. And that’s another reason that a Bayer purchase makes no sense – have you looked into how hard it is to lay people off or close a site in Germany? Years, it takes years, and buckets of money – just what Pfizer doesn’t need to take on.
So if you need an excuse to dump Pfizer’s stock (and why, exactly, would you be holding Pfizer stock?) a purchase of Bayer would be the perfect signal that they’ve lost their minds in Groton. I don’t think they have, though. Not completely. Not quite yet.
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September 3, 2008
Posted by Derek
It’s a truism that half of all advertising dollars are wasted, but that no one buying the ads can be sure which half it is. Advertising from the drug companies is ubiquitous: how much of that is doing them no good?
A recent study suggests that the widely reviled direct-to-consumer (DTC) campaigns may be in that category. A paper in the British Medical Journal looks at the cross-border effect of US-based advertising on English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, on the reasonable assumption that the former group is more likely to pay attention. They picked products that had been on the market for at least a year before the ad campaigns started, and looked at the number of prescriptions among both groups once the ads started running. What they found was no effect on the prescriptions for Schering-Plough’s Nasonex (mometasone) and Wyeth and Amgen’s Enbrel (etanercept), both of which were heavily advertised. Novartis’s Zelnorm (tegaserod, now off the market) did show a 40% rise, which gradually went back down again.
A reasonable theory to explain these results starts by looking at the respective markets. In the case of the first two drugs, a number of different therapies were already available. But Zelnorm was pretty much the only thing available in Canada for irritable bowel syndrome. It could be that DTC ads are useful in letting patients know that there’s finally something for a disease that previously had few options, but less effective in pushing into a crowded area. There’s also the multiple-step barrier problem – seeing a general practitioner and then a specialist, and so on – which can mitigate the effect of advertising, depending on the drug.
But the people who would know these effects best aren’t talking: the marketing departments of the drug companies themselves. As I’ve pointed out here before, the whole purpose of advertising is to make money: if you don’t increase sales enough to more than cover the cost of the ads, you’re clearly wasting your time. And that’s why I don’t have a lot of patience with outraged comparisons of pharma R&D budgets to marketing budgets, because the latter are there to bring in even more money for the former.
If, though, some of these marketing campaigns really are wasted money, then clearly that spending needs to be redirected. And that’s what makes me wonder. No one keeps a closer eye on prescription trends than the companies that sell the drugs, and they’re in the best position to see if a given ad campaign is doing anything or not. Even allowing for the usual human quota of inertia and incompetence, it would seem that DTC campaigns must be doing something for the companies involved, at least in many cases, or they wouldn’t exist at all. It’s also worth keeping in mind that what they may be doing is not so much boosting the number of prescriptions written as keeping them from falling. In the case of the drugs in the BMJ study, you have to wonder if the normal trend would have been for the number of scripts to have declined, while the ad campaigns held them steady.
That can be hard to prove, of course, and no doubt there are some marketing strategies that have far outlived their usefulness on just that kind of reasoning. But overall, I have trouble believing that DTC campaigns are useless across the board. Some of the marketing folks are weasels, but they’re not dumb ones. (It's also important to remember that DTC ads are only 5 to 10% of the total amount spent on drug promotion, according to the figures I've seen). In the end, I can agree with this statement from the paper:
Until we better understand how direct to consumer advertising modifies prescribing for particular drugs, debates about its positive and negative consequences will continue to be based on conjecture rather than strong evidence.
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August 21, 2008
Posted by Derek
Many readers will well remember when Merck bought the RNA-interference company Sirna in 2006. They paid over a billion dollars for them, and made the whole RNA area an even bigger field for speculation than it was already.
Another big player in that field is Alnylam, who have been making deals all over the place. Many shareholders have been waiting for someone to buy ALNY for a similarly hefty premium, but the wait has been long (and all those agreements make such an acqusition harder and harder to realize).
As that post (and this one, and this one from 2004)) should make clear, I've been a bit cooler on the prospects for RNA therapies. I think the current RNA field is full of extremely interesting things, wonderful discoveries, fascinating research tools which could lead to all sorts of things - but I don't necessarily think it's full of new drugs per se. Nucleic acid-based therapies are just nightmarish to administer, and unless a real breakthrough in doing that appears, I think that (as drugs) they're always going to have their ankles tied together.
Well, Jonas Alsenas at Leerink Swann agrees, and he's not afraid to say so. According to Mike Huckman at CNBC, the firm initiated coverage of Alnylam with Alsenas saying that he thought the stock should be trading at about half its current value, and that he didn't see them developing any products for many years, if ever. And he went on to this statement, which I don't think anyone in the industry can deny:
The pharmaceutical industry is often swept by new technology fads. They are caused by sincere enthusiasm, fears of being left behind, and desperation to fill chronically depleted development pipelines, in our view.
I'm sure that the ALNY investors are not going to take this well, but hey, the truth hurts. For now, I continue to agree that modern RNA techniques are extraordinary research tools - but not drugs, not in almost every case.
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August 18, 2008
Posted by Derek
So Genentech has told Roche to get lost – well, to a first approximation, anyway. I think what they’ve actually told them is to go open their Swiss wallets wider. What it comes down to now is how highly Genentech values itself versus how much Roche is willing to pay – the balance between those two will determine how things go. And then there are the large shareholders in Genentech to consider – if their idea of a good price clashes with the figure that Genentech’s board has in mind, then things could get more complicated. (And if the US dollar continues to climb against the Euro, that could complicated everyone's calculations, too - at the very least, it's speeding things up).
Personally, I think that Genentech is better off being left alone. But that’s no surprise – I think that in a lot of the M&A deals I’ve seen in the industry, particularly between large companies, I’ve thought that the participants should have stayed home and spent their money elsewhere. A personality defect, to be sure, and clear evidence that I’d never make it at an investment bank.
The reasons I think that Genentech is better off unmolested are probably the same ones that its own employees have. The company seems to have a good research culture going – they’ve been productive and willing to take risks, which is all you can ask of a drug discovery organization. Roche, for its part, isn’t exactly an Evil Empire, but they’re not Genentech. And that, I think, is what gets me about most of these deals. I think that there is no one best way to do drug discovery, since the problems we face are so varied. And that means that the more different approaches there are being tried, the better. We need a healthy ecology in this industry, and the closer we get to a monoculture, the worse off I think we’ll be. I think that Genentech has something to offer all its own, and that it’s in danger of being lost if Roche buys (and Roche-ifies) the place.
Some people out there are worried more than others. Roche doesn’t have as much experience in biologics, so they’ll want to retain the protein groups. (The question is whether they'll want to work for Roche!) But Genentech has also made a push into small molecules in recent years, and medicinal chemistry might be an area that Roche feels it has enough of already – they’re not buying Genentech for small molecules, after all. We’ll see over the next month if they’re buying Genentech at all. . .
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August 5, 2008
Posted by Derek
I've just been told (by a reliable source) that something big is up with the Roche-Palo Alto site. I don't know if this is part of their bid for Genentech or what, but the word "closing" has been mentioned. I hate to pass on news like this with no more details, but something does appear to be going on. Anyone with more details, please add them in the comments section.
So much for not posting on my vacation - I haven't even finished packing for my flight yet. What a year this is for the industry, and it's only August. . .
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August 4, 2008
Posted by Derek
As mentioned in the comments here (and as told to me by e-mail as well), a lot of Genentech employees are looking around for other options in the face of a possible Roche takeover. A lot of Genentech employees – some other Bay area biotechs are apparently seeing shoals of CVs coming in. Does that ever give an acquiring company pause, when people start diving over the sides at its approach? I suppose it depends on if they’re in it to buy the current pipeline or to buy some research productivity. But surely Roche wants some of the latter? If they do finally succeed in buying Genentech, what will they have bought by the time they finish?
And while we’re on the job-seeking topic, I’ve heard about some possibilities for ex-GSK people (and others out on the market from the various recent layoffs). Merck is hiring at their West Point, PA site, for one. EMD-Serono is expanding and looking for people in Rockland, MA. And a rare drug-discovery opportunity outside the industry is also available at the NIH Chemical Genomics Center. I have contacts for these if people want to send in CVs directly - just e-mail me and let me know.
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August 1, 2008
Posted by Derek
The ax is falling again at GlaxoSmithKline. This time it’s the oncology group.
Last month the cardiovascular people got this same treatment, you’ll recall, and there was some disagreement about how many jobs were being affected. But it looks like the company is moving one by one through its Centers of Excellence in Drug Discovery (CEDDs) and running a most excellent scythe through them. By the time they’re through, the total number of layoffs looks like it will be substantial indeed.
That’s because inside each area so far the cutbacks are pretty sweeping. Total oncology head count is apparently being reduced by about 40%. Discovery chemistry seems, unfortunately, to be getting it a bit worse, since some of the sub-areas aren't losing head count at all. The estimates I have are that of the c. 120 chemists in the area, about 60 are losing their jobs. That includes the entire oncology med-chem group at the Research Triangle Park location, and from what I'm told, none of them are being relocated to the Philadelphia-area sites. So much for discovering Tykerb, et al.
Are all of the CEDDs going to get this same treatment, or to the same degree? GSK isn’t saying, but I’d certainly bet on this sort of thing happening again as the year goes on. What the company’s research arm will look like when it’s all over is anybody’s guess, too, but there’s one thing for sure: it’ll be a heck of a lot smaller.
And whether this new trimmed-down inlicensed/outsourced GSK will be any more productive is anybody’s guess either. But we won’t know that for a long time. It’ll take quite a while just for all of these changes to stop reverberating through the company, for one thing, and then it’ll be several years after that before it’ll be possible to look at the pipeline and have a majority of it be a product of the new organization. As I’ve said before, this is one the biggest challenges in trying to engineer a large-scale change in a drug discovery shop – the lag time before you see the effects.
I’m already seeing resumes, but I’d like to invite any readers who know of openings for experienced drug discovery positions to either mention them in the comments or email me about them for a future post. (I did a lot of that during my own experience with a site closure, but of course, this time I don’t know most of the people involved personally). At the rate things are going, I’m going to have to start running classified ads down the right side of the page.
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Cancer
July 29, 2008
Posted by Derek
I've talked about a lot of difficult therapeutic areas, but here's another boulevard of broken dreams: schizophrenia drugs. I was working on follow-ups to a promising clincial candidate, which has since been promising a number of times without ever delivering. It certainly missed its endpoints in schizophrenia by a mile in Phase II. That was actually my introduction to the drug industry back in 1989 - I followed that up with several years working on Alzheimer's, another notorious graveyard of good ideas, which makes me wonder why I didn't just quit at some point and open that chain of all-you-can-eat catfish restaurants that the Northeast so desperately needs.
Of course, once in a while a drug for dementia actually works a bit, and since there's a huge underserved market out there, it's a prize worth seeking (ask Lilly or J&J). But clinical success rates are absolutely horrific in the whole CNS area, and the latest company to demonstrate this is Vanda Pharmaceuticals in Maryland (I've always wondered if they're named after a spectacular, and spectacularly finicky, genus of orchid).
Vanda's drug iloperidone has been kicking around for years now. Hoechst Marion Roussel (now Aventis) seems to have discovered it in the early 1990s, and they, Novartis, and Titan have all handed it off to someone else over the years. Vanda was the last in line, but they got the dreaded "Not Approvable" letter from the FDA yesterday, and the company's stock was blitzed, down 73 per cent at the close. And the thing is, this drug got a lot closer than anything I used to work on. Vanda did hit their endpoints against placebo and against haloperidol, but the problem is, these are not necessarily the standard of care in schizophrenia:
" The FDA stated that Vanda had demonstrated the effectiveness of iloperidone at 24 mg/day in the 3101 study for which the company reported results in December, 2006, and that the efficacy was similar to the active comparator, ziprasidone (Geodon(R), Pfizer Inc.). In addition, the FDA also stated that iloperidone was superior to placebo in patients with schizophrenia at doses of 12-16 mg/day and 20-24 mg/day in a prior study. However, the FDA expressed concern about the efficacy of iloperidone in patients with schizophrenia relative to the active comparator, risperidone (Risperdal(R), Johnson & Johnson), used in prior studies. The FDA indicated that it would require an additional trial comparing iloperidone to placebo and including an active comparator such as olanzapine (Zyprexa(R), Eli Lilly & Company) or risperidone in patients with schizophrenia to demonstrate the compound's efficacy further. The FDA also stated that it would require Vanda to obtain additional safety data for patients at a dose range of 20 to 24 mg/day."
So iloperidone works, but quite possibly not well enough compared to what's already on the market. That alone won't quite sink your drug - you can always hunt for a patient cohort that benefits from a new compound, and you'll quite likely be able to find one if you have the resources. But as that last line mentions, there are additional safety concerns.
Reading between the lines, it would appear that iloperidone had the best chance of distinguishing itself in efficacy at the higher doses, but that the FDA wanted to make sure that side effects didn't start kicking in up there. This paper makes you wonder if one problem is the (dreaded) QT interval prolongation. Many other factors have looked relatively clean in some of the reported trials.
I greatly doubt if we'll see iloperidone surface again. Vanda wouldn't seem to have the resources, and too many other organizations have passed on it. At this point, it's hard to see why more money would be put into the compound. . .
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Clinical Trials | The Central Nervous System
July 25, 2008
Posted by Derek
Now for some belated Roche/Genentech comments: the first thing that I found surprising about this was that there was some surprise involved. Even though a move to buy the rest of Genentech has always been a possibility, the actual timing of the announcement seems to have been unexpected out in South San Francisco. But it probably had to be that way.
What alternative was there? Roche wouldn’t have made some announcement along the lines of “You know, we’re thinking about buying the rest of Genentech sometime pretty soon”, because that would have made the deal even more expensive as everyone piled into the stock. Regulation FD would mean that they really couldn’t give a heads-up to Genentech’s management without telling the world – after all, these are two separate companies, so it’s not an internal matter. So this had to be done just like any company making a bid for any other – with the difference being that Roche already had a head start on a majority of Genentech.
The second thing that occurred to me, though, was “why, and why now?” The first half of that question is answered, as are most “I wonder how come. . .” queries are, with the word “money”. Genentech has been coining the stuff, and Roche would like to have all that revenue instead of just part of it. “Why now” comes down to money, too. The two companies were due to renegotiate their revenue sharing in 2015, and Roche apparently decided (among other factors) that the US dollar was about as cheap as it was going to get. You could turn the question around and ask why Roche took the whole don't-own-it-all approach in the first place. (They did own it all for a while, but put Genentech back out into the market in 1999).
I always assumed that they were worried about messing up whatever it was that had Genentech doing so well in the first place. If true, that showed an admirable level of self-knowledge on Roche’s part. Too many other companies seem to assume that the outfits that they buy will be just fine under the new letterhead – even better, probably, now that they’ve been bought by such a fine bunch of people! But it certainly doesn’t always work out that way. The challenge is to keep the acquired company, and its culture, from dissolving into the larger one like a sugar cube. (The alternative is to just buy companies for their physical or IP assets, not giving a hoot for who might be working there, and we’ve seen plenty of that, too).
But Genentech is a mighty big sugar cube, and it’s a long way from the rest of Roche’s operations. I’d guess that the folks in Basel are planning (hoping) that Genentech will go on just like it has, just with a few accounting adjustments (like all the money ending up on Roche’s books). There are probably a lot of reassuring messages going out to the Genentech people about how gosh, we already had a majority interest in you, so this is just sort of a formality, and it’ll probably save lots of money besides, you know, so just keep right on doing what you’re doing. . .
We’ll see. The Swiss are not known for their delicate managerial touch. One solution that's been talked about would be (once Roche has Avastin et al. safely booked) for them to spin out a new version of Genentech as a publicly traded company again - 1999 all over again. And we'll see if Genentech even goes for the offer - there's a lot of doubt about that, at least at the price the Roche is offering. They've apparently opted out of the provisions in the 1999 agreement about how Roche could buy them, so all sorts of things are now possible. . .
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July 22, 2008
Posted by Derek
Merck took the unusual step of delaying its earnings release yesterday until after the close of the market. A report on another clinical study of Vytorin (ezetimibe), their drug with Schering-Plough, was coming out, so they put the numbers on hold until after the press release yesterday afternoon. Naturally, this led to a lot of speculation about what was going on. A conspiracy-minded website vastly unfriendly to Schering-Plough suspected some sort of elaborate ruse to drum up publicity.
But that sort of thinking doesn't take you very far, unless you count the distance you rack up going around in circles. As it turned out, the SEAS trial (Simvastatin and Ezetimibe in Aortic Stenosis) was, in fact, very bad publicity indeed for the drug and for both companies. In fact, a real conspiracy would have made sure that these numbers never saw the light of day, or were at least released at 6 PM on a Friday. But no, the spotlight was on them good and proper.
This trial studied patients with chronic aortic stenosis, which is a different condition than classic atherosclerosis. The two have enough similarities, though, that there has been much interest in whether statin treatment could be effective. The primary endpoint, a composite of aortic valve and general cardiovascular events, was missed. Vytorin was no better than placebo. It reached significance against one secondary endpoint, reducing the risk of various ischemic events, but not in any dramatic fashion.
That's not necessarily a surprise, since there's not a well-established therapy for aortic stenosis (thus the trial design versus placebo). As several commenters to the conference call after the press conference pointed out, this shouldn't change clinical practice much at all. But it's not what Merck and Schering-Plough needed to hear, that's for sure, because the sound bite will be "Vytorin Fails Again".
Actually, the sound bite will be even worse than that. There are a lot of headlines this morning about another observation from the SEAS trial: that significantly more patients in the treatment arm of the study were diagnosed with cancer. That's a red warning light, for sure, but in this case we have at least some data to decide how much of one.
For one thing, as far as I know there have been no reports of increased cancer among the patients taking Vytorin out in the marketplace - of course, one could argue that this might have been missed, but if the effect were as large as seen in the SEAS study, I don't think it would have been. Analyses of the earlier Vytorin trials and the ongoing IMPROVE-IT trial versus Zocor have also shown no cancer risk, and the latter trial is continuing. So for now, it would appear that either this was a nasty result by chance, or (a longer shot) that there's something different about the aortic stenosis patients that leads to major trouble with Vytorin.
None of these scientific and statistical arguments, and I mean none of them, will avail Schering-Plough and Merck. Among people who've heard of Vytorin at all, the first thing that will come to mind is "doesn't work", and after today's headlines, the second thing that will come to mind is "cancer". Just what you want, to put out press releases that your compound, even though it failed to work again, isn't actually a cancer risk. You really couldn't do worse; a gang of saboteurs couldn't have done worse. Of course, there's no such gang: the companies themselves authorized these trials, thinking that there were home runs to be hit. But all these sidelines - familial hypercholesteremia, aortic stenosis - have only sown fear, confusion, and doubt. The only thing that I can see rescuing Vytorin as a useful drug is for the IMPROVE-IT results to show really robust efficacy in its real-world patients. And I wonder if even that could be enough.
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Cancer | Cardiovascular Disease | Clinical Trials | Toxicology
July 11, 2008
Posted by Derek
Here's an interesting idea: Merck, Lilly, and Pfizer are bankrolling a startup company to look for new technologies for drug development. Enlight Biosciences will focus on the biggest bottlenecks and risk points in the process, including new imaging techniques for preclinical and clinical evaluation of drug candidates, predictive toxicology and pharmacokinetics, clinical biomarkers, new models of disease, delivery methods for protein- and nucleic acid-based therapies, and so on.
It's safe to say that if any real advances are made in any of these, the venture will have to be classed as a success. These are hard problems, and it's not like there's been no financial incentive to solve any of them. (On the contrary - billions of dollars are out there waiting for anyone who can truly do a better job at these things). I wish these people a lot of luck, and I'm glad to see them doing what they're doing, but I do wish that there were more details available on how they plan to go about things. The opening press release leaves a lot of things unspoken, no doubt by design. (For instance, where are the labs going to be? What's the hoped-for balance of industry types to academics? How many people do they plan to have working on these things, and how will the companies involved plan to share the resulting technologies?)
Enlight is a creation of Puretech Ventures, a Boston VC firm that's been targeting early-stage ideas in these areas. Getting buy-in from the three companies above will definitely help, but their commitment isn't too clear at present. For now, it looks like they're getting to take a fresh look at some areas of great interest, without necessarily having to spend a lot of their own money. The press release says that Enlight will "direct up to $39 million" toward the areas listed on their web site, but those problems will eat thirty-nine million dollars without even reaching for the salt. Further funding is no doubt in the works, with the Merck/Pfizer/Lilly names as a guarantee of seriousness, and if any of these projects pan out, the money will arrive with alacrity.
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Drug Assays | Drug Development
July 10, 2008
Posted by Derek
In the wake of continued expansion of medicinal chemistry efforts in China, a discussion between me and some of my colleagues at work had me sticking to my positions: (1) Scientific outsourcing is not going to go away, although it may move from country to country as costs change. (2) If you’re going to stay employed as a medicinal chemist in a high-wage area like the US, you have to bring something that can’t be purchased so easily overseas.
We got to discussing what that something is. One position was that it could be fast in-house turnaround time, but while true, that one makes me uneasy. It is easier to run a fast-moving project with in-house chemistry, because you can react more quickly to changes. The cycle time for stuff that’s being done in India and China is always going to be longer. But I expect that the outsourcing outfits are working on that problem, too, in order to bring in more business. So if you’re going to compete with them just on the basis of turnaround, you’re saying that you’ll always be able to make the compounds quickly enough to justify your higher salary. Not, I think, necessarily a safe bet.
I’d rather not try to outdo the low-margin people at their own game. I held out for the high-wage advantages being things like idea generation, the ability to take on harder chemistry that doesn’t lend itself as well to making libraries of compounds, and the advantages of real-time interaction with the biologists, PK, and formulations people. You’ll note that all of these are harder than cranking out methyl-ethyl-butyl-futile analog lists. That’s outsourcing in a nutshell: the easy stuff can be done more cheaply somewhere else, so the hard stuff is going to be left for us. We’d better get used to it, and fast. (Some of that hard stuff will eventually be done offshore as well, but it’ll be more expensive to do, intrinsically, and offshore wages in general will have risen by then. The big cost savings will be at the margin, for the routine work, and I expect other countries to rise up and take business away from India and China as their economies improve).
A few more points: I get a fairly constant stream of complaints about the whole business of outsourcing, but I have to say that I don’t see the point of many of them. I mean, I understand why people are upset, but I don’t see what complaining about it is supposed to lead to. What are we going to do, lobby for a law that forbids any aspect of drug discovery to take place outside our borders? Whether you think that’s a good idea or not, it’s not going to happen, any more than we’re going to do the same thing for clothing, cars, or candy bars. If it’s feasible and effective to do something more cheaply, companies will do it more cheaply. ‘Twas ever thus.
It’s true that there’s room to argue about how appropriate all the chemistry outsourcing is. Some of it is surely being misused, and there are surely some companies that are (or will try) outsourcing too much of their expertise, then ending up less effective than they would have been. Trends are taken to extremes, before things settle back. But things are never going to settle back to the pre-outsourcing employment situation for chemists. For better or worse – and I still think that overall, it’s for better – industrial science can now be found (and contracted for) around the globe.
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July 7, 2008
Posted by Derek
I thought I’d start out the week by opening the mailbag for a recent reply to my posts about Pfizer’s research cutbacks. Here’s a perspective that you won’t get from me, at any rate:
You never surprise me of your uncanny ability to cast good news in a negative light.
Pfizer has been a bloated company following its acquisitions of Warner Lambert and Pharmacia & Upjohn. The company should have rationalized its workforce, including sales, marketing, and most especially R&D, a long time ago. So, hopefully, you are correct and there will be massive layoffs in R&D soon. Why should Pfizer spend all that money on high risk, low probability of success R&D projects?
Pfizer's belated cost-cutting will make it a leaner and more focused company. All the bad news is out there. Pfizer generates over $7 billion in free cash flow annually and pays a 7.4% dividend. Projected 2012 earnings per share (without Lipitor) are $2.05. So the stock is trading today fully discounting Lipitor and any possible good news the next 5 years. Does that really make sense to you?
So keep up your trash talk, so to speak. Pfizer today is money in the bank. The lower you can drive the stock price, the greater the future return. I just love folks like you who help to create great buying opportunities. Are you certain you're not buying Pfizer as you trash talk??
My response? Well, I can reply on several levels. I’m actually going to skip the outraged how-dare-you stuff about what a great thing it is that all those research people are losing their jobs, though. Let’s just take that as having been delivered, because I think a lot of good invective would just be wasted, anyway. We’ll keep this on a strictly business level, since my correspondent is nothing if not all business.
And from a business perspective, he has the beginning of a point. As many readers can attest, Pfizer’s in-house research productivity has not been good – at least, nowhere near as good as it’s had to be to sustain a company as huge as Pfizer. (There’s the problem, actually – as I’ve said before, the one thing that certainly doesn’t scale when a company gets larger is research productivity). So from my correspondent’s perspective, what do you do with the underperforming units of a company? You lop ‘em off, like pruning a shrub to get rid of unsightly branches.
Of course, one branch of a bush is pretty much like another as far as the survival of the whole plant goes, but cutting the R&D out of an R&D organization is not without risks. A Pfizer investor might be excused for forgetting that, since most of the company’s money has been made off the research of other labs, but the Lipitors do have to come from somewhere, eventually. And try as I might, I just can’t see Pfizer buying its way out of its current troubles. So, why should Pfizer spend its money on those "high risk, low probability of success R&D projects"? Because that's the only kind of R&D projects there are.
Now, as to whether all the bad news is already out there, I won't speculate. But I do know that if I had a dollar for every time someone proclaimed that all the bad news was already in some company's stock, I wouldn't have to work for a living. I invite my correspondent, though, to take a look at the company's history before sitting back and trusting those EPS numbers from the past. Let's take a trip down memory lane, back to the days of 2002, when the analysts said that it was going to earn about $1.60 per share for that year, $1.84 in 2003, and $2.14 per share in 2004. Watch it go! And after that, hey, who knew. . .well, reality intervened on those forecasts, but by 2005, now, double-digit growth was on the way.
Let's take a look at the company's actual financials and stock price over that period. It isn't inspiring. Click around on that chart: if you'd bought Pfizer ten years ago, you would have been flat with the index until early 2004, but since then it's been a disaster. Now, like my correspondent, you may be able to look at this and figure that hey, what could go wrong, and that all the bad news just has to be in by now, and that those earnings forecasts will finally start working out. Or. . .
So let's file that statement away for future reference: "Pfizer today is money in the bank". That's July of 2008, folks, and if you'd like to put some of your cash down on that statement, PFE is available during normal trading hours. I'll sit this one out.
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Drug Industry History
June 16, 2008
Posted by Derek
About a year ago, I wrote about GSK's attempt to sell the lipase inhibitor orlistat over the counter as Alli:
"So my forecast for Alli is strong sales - for a while. Then it takes a dive, never to scale those heights again, as the word gets out. And the demand continues to grow for a weight-loss drug that works. . ."
Thanks to Pharmalot, this week we find this AP story which seems to confirm that suspicion. Sales for Alli aren't up to GSK's hopes, and the company is declining to say how much repeat business there is after people have tried it out, which says all that needs to be said. And this after one of their biggest marketing campaigns ever.
What still throws me is that an analyst quoted in the piece still talks about it as a drug that should, in theory, be a big seller. As that post from last summer makes clear, I've never once understood that, since Roche never could make it a huge seller as Xenical. You'll never be able to get around the unpleasant side effects of a pancreatic lipase inhibitor, as far as I can see, and you'll never be able to advertise one without mentioning them.
I think that the new, slimmed-down GSK organization is wasting money on this whole idea. But hey, Marketing thinks it's a great opportunity. . .
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+ TrackBacks (0) | Category: Business and Markets | Diabetes and Obesity
June 12, 2008
Posted by Derek
Well, this is turning into GlaxoSmithKline week around here, but with good reason. I’ve had a lot of mail from people who have been affected by this week’s cutbacks, and others who left the company before the latest round. And that leads to these thoughts for today:
1. The company is being rather coy when they describe the current layoffs as only involving 2% of the work force. The recent cuts were focused on the Centers for Excellence in Drug Discovery (CEDDS), which is where the great bulk of discovery medicinal chemists are. To be more specific, this one seems to have hit the Metabolic Pathways group especially hard, and there’s thought that the other CEDDS will be going through similar contractions.
And there have been other cutbacks over the last few months, though, and there are surely more to come. With such a smaller head count in the CEDDS, everyone seems to be expecting the related groups to be next in line – IT, chemical development, more of the in-house biology, and so on. If the company is doing more research on the outside, then some of these folks will presumably not be needed. GSK looks to be shrinking for many months to come.
That makes a person wonder about whether these cutbacks are meant to send some big signal to the investors or not. You'd think that you'd make a bigger deal out of them if that were the case, rather than minimizing them for the public, as the company seems to be doing.
2. It’s going to be interesting to watch to see if the new style the company is trying will work. They’re breaking down the CEDDS into even smaller teams, from what I hear, turning the discovery organization into who-knows-how-many smaller competing units. It’s been described as the “if only we were a bunch of startups” philosophy, and there are several points to consider about that.
For one thing, startups may not be as wonderful as they appear statistically, because of survivorship bias: a number of them disappear with people having hardly been aware that they were around in the first place. Even if that’s a desirable state of affairs, will a large company be able to replicate it in-house? And even if it can be done, will it happen in this case, or will the teams be either too large to be nimble or too small to work? I’ve no idea. Neither does anyone else, and it'll be years before we know.
3. There have been a lot of comments, both here and at other news sites, about how this is another evil deed of the MBA folks, and if they’d only turn things over to the scientists and get back to the science, the company wouldn’t be in this position. Hmmm.
What I'm about to say feels strange to me, because I’m a scientist through-and-through, and I’ve done my share of complaining about ridiculous business attitudes. For that matter, I've found myself laid off though what I thought was a mistaken site closure. But all that said, there’s a case to be made that GSK partly got themselves into this fix by letting the scientists free to do science. That’s how I see, for example, the huge effort the company had for years in nuclear receptors. A massive amount of fundamental work was done, but (because it’s such a horrendously difficult area) little or nothing ever came out the far end to make anyone any money. I'm willing to be corrected on those points, but that's how I see it now.
And it’s not like the company’s productivity has been one of the wonders of the world overall. One correspondent, an ex-GSK researcher, pointed out to me in an e-mail that one of the sites hit hard this week had taken one drug to market in twenty-five years. Some of that is surely bad luck, but that explanation can only take you so far.
It’s interesting to hear people talk about the good old days in the industry. The other day I saw a comment about getting things back to the good productive days of the mid-to-late 1990s, which (I can tell you) didn’t seem to flippin’ productive at the time. But there are stories beyond counting of the days when Company XYZ Really Had Their Act Together, when the scientists were happy and management was wise and stayed out of their way, and the clinical candidates flowed like a free bar at an ACS meeting.
I used to feel bad, hearing these tales, sorry that I’d missed such days. But then I noted their similarity to the myths of Golden Ages that you see everywhere, and began to wonder. The drug industry was definitely a different place back when. Screening cascades weren’t so rigorous, animal models ruled the day (and actually, in some cases, steered projects right more quickly than their replacements), and there were more good targets that hadn’t been exploited yet. I’m willing to stipulate all that; it was a different world.
But most of us, I think, date the Real Good Old Days of the industry to a period before we joined – no matter when that was. Listening to people talk about when things were good is like listening to the guys down at the lake tell you that you should have been around last week when the fish were biting. There were any number of severe problems back in any Golden Era, but those sort of disappear into the glowing mist.
4. So GSK’s upper management is doing what upper management does: they’re trying to get a better return on their money – for which, read “the money of the shareholders”. Looking over the last ten years or so, they’ve decided that what the company has been doing has not been working. The loss of Avandia (whose discovery goes back further than that period) made the problems unignorable. So they’re trying something different. It’s hard to make the case that something different wasn’t needed.
We can all argue about whether this particular something is the right idea, or whether it’s being implemented in the right way. But no one should be surprised that a company with GSK’s current issues and cost structure is being shaken up. These cutbacks may be the work of people who are mistaken; they may even be the work of fools. But it's not the work of greedy sociopaths bent on destroying the drug industry. I’d give up on that line of thought and switch to something more useful.
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June 11, 2008
Posted by Derek
Thoughts on the GSK cutbacks, whose size, interestingly, is reported by Reuters this morning as (only) 350 jobs (i.e. 2%) worldwide, a figure which does not jibe with what I've been hearing from various people on the ground:
1. If the company seriously expects external collaborations to run at the same level of detail and efficiency as their internal research, they’re kidding themselves. I think – or hope – that they’re smarter than that, and that they’re planning to mostly just buy these things outright, as with Sirtris, rather than strike collaborative deals for them. Of course, they now have fewer people to prosecute the fruits of those acquisitions, but someone appears to think the numbers add up.
2. Doesn’t a statement that you’re going to emphasize external research rather than internal stand as an indictment of upper management? After all, who set the priorities and funded the programs? They surely won’t let individual project leaders or area heads explain lack of progress as “just one of those things, you know how it goes”, so how to explain what is apparently a catastrophic lack of progress across the board? And what does this say about the whole “Centers of Excellence” framework for drug discovery, erected some years ago at great cost of time and money?
3. Still, if you’re going to do such as thing as cut half your research staff, it’s probably better to go ahead and do it the way that GSK did. Update: see the comments. This has actually dragged on for a while, and productivity appears to have gone where it goes in the sentence after next. Get it over with in one day rather than spread it out over time, department by department. The latter method sends productivity straight to hell. The death-of-a-thousand-cuts routine tends to terrify and dismay everyone, even in areas that are left untouched, and it sends a lot of good people out the door on their own.
4. But it’s not that productivity is going to be anything wonderful at GSK now. The people that are left will feel (will have felt?) a brief interval of relief that they still have jobs. But that’s followed by the employment equivalent of survivor guilt as they watch longtime colleagues go out the door, and on the heels of that comes the realization that nothing in particular holds the company back from doing the same thing to them, whenever it sees fit. That brings on (rightly) a feeling that you owe your company exactly as much loyalty as it seems to owe you. Many good people will be looking for the door themselves, and will be gone as soon as an opportunity presents itself.
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June 10, 2008
Posted by Derek
Update: GSK is indeed wielding the ax today and tomorrow. I'm hearing that that the smallest cuts are around 40% of the entire research staff at the various sites. This is big, and it's bad. . .
GlaxoSmithKline has been going through some sort of mid-life crisis recently. Their chairman, Jean-Pierre Garnier, just retired amidst the mutter of angry shareholders, for one thing. And the company has been splashing out on some very flashy acquisitions, such as the Sirtris deal which has just now completed. This is all going on against the backdrop of the Avandia disaster, and a perceived drought of current clinical successes.
Now the company is cutting their own head count in research, to what sounds like a pretty serious degree. There have been substantial cuts at their sites in Italy and the UK, and the Research Triangle and Pennsylvania sites are getting it even harder, from what I'm hearing. Some chemistry areas are losing more than half their people. I believe that today is the day that a lot of people are hearing whether they stay or go, and I feel bad just hearing it from a distance, having seen that stuff close up a few times myself.
The proximate cause of all this turmoil is probably the loss of all that Avandia revenue, although that may have just advanced the timetable on some decisions that the eompany was going to make eventually no matter what. Many GSK scientists are (understandably) feeling as if they’re being ditched in favor of a bunch of people whose main advantage is that upper management isn’t so familiar with them yet.
Whether that’s true or not, it’s a tough one to refute. There is a persistent “grass is greener” mentality in the drug industry. Perhaps that’s partly because, on an individual basis, the grass really is often greener. The best way to work your way up in the industry, for the majority of scientists, is to jump ship once in a while, which keeps you from being pigeonholed or taken for granted in your current company. (A less charitable view, accurate in a few cases, is that it’s in some people’s best interest to leave before everyone else catches on to them).
And on a company-wide level, it’s hard not to think of everyone else as being at least a little more competent than your own shop is. That’s because you see the inevitable bozo mistakes of your own workplace up close, whereas you don’t get such good seats for the ones happening elsewhere. And the side that all drug companies show to their competition is a bristling pile of patents and confident press releases about their mighty drug pipelines. You know, looking at your own company’s public face, how much of it is real and how much is bravado or wishful thinking. But it’s hard to keep in mind that the same goes for everyone else, too.
I don’t know how much this effect is contributing to what’s going on at GSK. After all, some of the deals that the company’s making are for specific development compounds that they didn’t have in house. But I’m pretty sure that there are researchers over there who are thinking about whether they could have gotten a sirtuin program off the ground a few years ago, like the one they just bought. Or what would have happened to them if they'd tried. . .
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June 2, 2008
Posted by Derek
A longtime reader pointed me to this article from Business Week. Fuji Film of Japan, facing all kinds of problems like the other film makers of the world, has decided to put some of its money into a more exciting, profitable, high-margin business: pharmaceuticals! Back in February they made an offer for small-to-medium sized Toyama.
Readers who have been around the industry for a few years may shudder, remembering Kodak's disastrous experience with Sterling-Winthrop. (You couldn't have paid a gang of saboteurs to do a better - well, worse - job on Sterling and its employees; this PDF will give you some of the story). The details of the interview, which gets crazier as it goes on, do not inspire happy feelings. Well, unless schadenfreude counts as "happy", that is. Feast on this, for example, from Yuzo Toda, the company's VP for Life Sciences:
"The film in your camera is about 15 microns (one-thousandth of a millimeter) thick. Our color film has 17 different layers, each with a different function, and it contains nearly 100 different chemicals. Controlling the chemical reaction to develop these photos is extremely difficult. You have to start and stop the various chemicals at exactly the right time to make it all work. The trick is all in the conversion of chemicals. Drugs targeting a specific [organ or receptor in the body] work the same way. We have a chemical library of 200,000 compounds, which we think will help us with creating new compounds, and we have an expertise in nanotechnology. From our viewpoint, it's more a question of why not pharmaceuticals?"
Well, with a library of two hundred thousand compounds (cue Mike Myers as Dr. Evil, demanding his million dollars), I don't see what's going to hold them back. Considering the sorts of wonderfully druglike photosensitive absorbers and dye-coupling agents they're stocked up with, I'm sure the screening hit rates will be exciting, too. And yes, I am considering making "The trick is all in the conversion of chemicals" the new slogan of this blog, and I urge Fuji to make it the advertising tag line for their whole drug business.
But let's not pick on just one guy. Here's Toshio Takahashi, the company's CFO:
"Many drugs are made in higher dosages than we need. That's because they can't be fully absorbed by our bodies. It's a waste of resources, and it can have an adverse effect on organs such as the stomach and liver. We're researching compounds that will work in smaller doses because they will target a specific part of the body."
Now there's a thought. I wish Fuji luck with these innovative ideas, although I don't think I'm capable of delivering the quantities of luck that it appears they'll need. I assume that the people at Toyama don't talk this way, i.e., as if they'd just been beamed in from Neptune and then hit over the head, and for all I know they're burying their heads in their hands as they read this stuff, too. Who knows, maybe if Fuji can keep their hands off of them and not impart too many lessons from the film business, the deal could work.
But for now, check out the interview, and be glad it's not you. Sheesh.
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May 29, 2008
Posted by Derek
Since I was talking the other day about the analytical habit of mind, this is a good time to link to an article by someone who has it like few other people alive: Freeman Dyson, who is thankfully still with us and still thinking hard. At the moment, he seems to be thinking about something that involves chemistry, physics, economics, and plenty of politics.
He has an article in the latest New York Review of Books that i |