Well, a lot of comments have come in about the last post on Chinese industrial espionage - some temperate, some not. I wanted to fill out another post responding to some of these, so, in no particular order:
1. "Everyone does this all the time". Indeed. Espionage is a constant fact of international relations; the "gentlemen do not read each other's mail" comment was wildly out of sync with reality even in its own time. I don't mean to suggest that I'm shocked by the fact of Chinese intelligence-gathering, although its scope and thoroughness is impressive. But I think that everyone should be aware that it goes on - and that pointing out that it's going on is also a move in the same game. We're not hearing so much about this from the US government now for no reason; someone thinks that there's an advantage in making these accusations public in such detail.
2. "More to the point, the US does this too, and thus has no room to talk". This is merely a tu quoque argument, and as such doesn't address any underlying issues. Of course the US engages in espionage, and I hope that we're good at it. But for the most part, we're doing it for a different purpose than some of the Chinese activity that's been revealed. I tend to think that more of ours is national-security related, and less pure economics - more "How can we figure out what these guys are up to?" and less "How can we jump-start our aerospace industry?"
Now, one big reason for that is that the US is not as far behind anyone else in the world as China feels itself to be behind in some key industries. They have more to gain. I'm sure that China does plenty of national-security spying, but for a country whose economy is as export-driven as China's, economic reasons and national security reasons are even more tangled together than usual. And yes, other countries have done just this sort of thing in the past. See the story of how the British got rubber-tree seeds to plant in Malaysia. Or earlier, how they learned the details of tea production and got that going in India, and that's not even mentioning their strategy of smoothing out the trade imbalance with opium sales. We shouldn't allow ourselves, though, to think that this stuff is just for the history books.
3. "OK then, what's more, the US did just this kind of economic/industrial snooping back when it was an up-and-coming nation".. This is another tu quoque, but the facts are as stated. In the 19th century, the US was generally a backwater compared to the European powers, and we did indeed have a reputation as the Kings of Shoddy Unauthorized Knockoffs (even of our own inventions). Charles Dickens was enraged when he visited to find how many pirated versions of his works were for sale, and this tradition took a long time to die out. (See, for example, the saga of how Donald Wollheim unilaterally decided in the 1960s that Tolkein's publishers had not properly secured the US copyright for The Lord of the Rings).
But while we were at our peak as intellectual property buccaneers, we were not simultaneously considered both a world power and a huge financial market. China is not to the rest of the world as the US of the 1850s was. Our big exports were agricultural products; we did not have huge factories on which many of the world's largest corporations were depending. China, in catch-up mode though it may be, is not a technological backwater. It has nuclear weapons and a manned space program - mind you, both of those were developed partly through just the sort of short-cutting we're talking about.
4. OK, that means that every Chinese post-doc is a spy. Or a potential spy, right? Here's where I flip over to the other side. Now, there surely has been intelligence gathering by such routes. But it appears that a lot of work is being done from back home, by large groups associated with the People's Liberation Army and various Chinese intelligence agencies. And when you consider what a lot of postdocs end up working on, you can see that most of it isn't going to confer much of an advantage on anyone - what are they going to do, steal K. C. Nicolau's strategy for an 89-step synthesis? I think it would be a lot more useful for US institutions to spend their time hardening their security against wholesale data-scooping than giving their foreign postdocs the fish-eye. Most of them are just trying to make better lives for themselves.
So where does this leave us? I think that China's position is unique. They're an enormous country of huge economic and political importance. And their economy is a mixture that might be called "authoritarian capitalist", no matter what they call it themselves. So for a country like the US, they're simultaneously a vital trading partner, and a potential political adversary and rival. (And the US is the same thing to China, naturally). It's a tricky balance, and there are a lot of conflicts of interest.
We're seeing one in the drug industry. No major company can afford to ignore the Chinese market. The financial advantages of pharma outsourcing have been hard to ignore, too (leaving aside the question of its effectiveness, which varies). But no company can afford to ignore the possibility that Chinese industry (or the Chinese government itself) might rip them off. These things exist simultaneously, and it's very much worth the effort keeping both of them in mind.